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This article discusses the transformation of the liberal international order, with reference to the 
ways in which global shifts affect the developmental paradigms among the emerging middle 
powers. Although it is rarely contested that the liberal order is being severely tested, the dynamics 
and potential consequences of this transformation are a matter of intense controversy. Also, the 
debate mainly focuses on great power politics, without paying adequate attention to the ways in 
which middle powers are influenced by and inform the transition to a post-liberal international 
order. By focusing on the case of Turkey, this article addresses whether non-Western great 
powers (Russia and China in particular) are leading the emergence of alternative order(s), and if 
so, through which mechanisms. Based on the reciprocal interactions between ideas, material 
capabilities, and institutions, I argue that the preferences of the Turkish ruling elites seem to be 
gradually shifting from a Western-oriented liberal model towards a variety of “state capitalism” 
as an alternative developmental paradigm in a post-liberal international order. 
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The Politics of State Capitalism in a Post-Liberal International Order:  
The Case of Turkey 
	
Introduction 
This article investigates the nature, properties, and contradictions of the transformation in 
the liberal international order, with reference to the ways in which the non-Western great 
powers (Russia and China in particular) inform the developmental paradigms among the 
emerging middle powers. The mainstream approaches portray two mutually exclusive 
trends regarding the nature of the current shifts in the international system. One strand of 
research argues that the liberal international order will endure, despite the current 
relocations in material power, certain governance problems and institutional discontent.1 
According to liberal scholars defending the supremacy of liberal internationalism, 
“today’s dire predictions ignore [liberalism’s] past successes,” as “liberal democracies 
have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses.”2 Making a 
categorical distinction between the relative decline of the US hegemony and the densely 
institutionalized, rule-based liberal international order, Ikenberry suggests that China’s 
rise can be accommodated within the existing multilateral governance framework, since 
China, as one of the chief beneficiaries taking advantage of open global markets, does not 
have any revisionist incentives to overturn it.3 Focusing on global governance, Kahler 
also suggests that the large emerging powers “are less likely to be radical reformers than 
conservatives.”4  
Alternative explanations drawing on different paradigms, however, assert that 
what we witness today is not only a transition to multi-polarity, but also to a multi-order 
	 3	
world in which liberal norms and values are no longer the dominant, but merely one of 
several alternative visions of the international order.5 The emerging perspectives on the 
international order, as the argument goes, rely on different conceptions of collective 
identity, political arrangements, and economic norms. According to Acharya, for 
instance, “in a world of multiple modernities […] Western liberal modernity (and its 
preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is 
on offer.”6 The recent shifts indicate that the liberal hegemonic system is likely to give 
way to a post-liberal international order described as an age of hybridity, where the 
constitutive pillars of the mainstream path toward modernization—that is, free market 
economy and liberal democracy—are genuinely challenged by non-Western powers in 
the face of the redistribution of material power within the international system.  
It appears that, regardless of the direction and nature of change, debates on 
international transformations overly focus on “great power politics,” without paying 
adequate attention to the ways in which emerging middle powers are influenced by and 
inform on-going shifts in international politics. In a similar vein, both perspectives 
portrayed above need to be enriched through empirically grounded research to assess the 
ways in which the developing economies are responding to and being affected by the 
alleged weakening of the liberal international order. From this perspective, there is still a 
gap in the literature in terms of in-depth case studies to test macro-level inferences and to 
supplement broad generalizations. This article frames an argument to address the 
question whether the non-Western great powers are leading the advent of alternative 
order(s), and if so, through which mechanisms. It maintains that the founding pillars of 
the liberal international order are increasingly contested among the emerging middle 
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powers. For instance, “state capitalism,” which has gained traction in the non-Western 
great powers as an alternative to the neoliberal economic model and liberal democratic 
governance, is making its way into other mid-range states, even those located in the 
periphery of Europe. By focusing on Turkey as a “least likely case,” this article 
demonstrates that the perspectives and preferences of the Turkish ruling elites seem to be 
gradually shifting from the Western-oriented liberal templates toward the Russia-China 
axis promoting alternative developmental paradigms. I suggest, however, that, although 
state capitalism proves increasingly popular in a growing number of cases, it also harbors 
a set of inherent dilemmas that deserve a thorough analysis of their own. 
 The rest of the article proceeds as follows:	 The following section sketches an 
analytical framework that seeks to explain the sources of and pathways through which the 
developmental shifts taking place with the re-emergence of the non-Western great 
powers. The third section focuses on recent shifts in the Turkish political economy to 
explore how state capitalism makes its way into the middle powers. The fourth section 
discusses some inchoate aspects and inherent paradoxes of the new developmental 
models. The final section concludes the article by delineating avenues for further 
research.      	
	
A Framework for Analysis: Alternative Paths to Development?  
 
There appears to exist in the literature a quasi-consensus that the current international 
order is in the midst of profound shifts in terms of economic and political governance 
structures. The nature of this transformation, however, remains a topic of intense 
controversy. A central question concerns whether the non-Western great powers are 
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investing in and leading the advent of alternative order(s), and if so, through which 
mechanisms. This section sketches an analytical framework identifying the main 
mechanisms that alternative developmental paradigms are becoming part of the policy 
repertoires in the middle powers exposed to the vagaries of the shifting international 
order. The large-scale transformations, as Sil and Katzenstein argue, prove highly 
complex; therefore, they require foregoing mono-causal, paradigm-bound research that 
“runs the risk of a high degree of error […] to explain phenomena.”7 The framework 
sketched in this article has its origins in Robert Cox’s writings, which focus on the 
complex interaction of “three categories of forces (expressed as potentials)” that structure 
the configuration of alternative orders.8 It also draws on the rich tradition of multi-
paradigm research in comparative politics, which attempts to account for the complexity 
of significant political-economic phenomena. 9  The article maintains that the 
configuration of three interconnected and reciprocal mechanisms—that is, ideas, material 
interests, and institutions (3Is)— condition the predominant developmental paradigms in 
the target countries, which in turn undermine the institutional and normative 
underpinnings of the liberal international order, whether intentionally or unintentionally 
(Table 1).  
 
Ideas: Lineages of State Capitalism 
As the key components of construction and change in international orders, ideational 
mechanisms constitute the take-off point. The literature has established that critical 
junctures in the wake of significant transformations are conducive to the advent of new 
ideational paradigms.10 As Blyth suggests, especially in times of increasing uncertainty 
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and anxiety, when “agents are unsure as to what their interests actually are,” ideas play a 
constitutive role, as “they diagnose ‘what has gone wrong’ and ‘what is to be done.’”11 
Ideas—and particularly “the clash of rival collective images,” as Cox points out—
“represent potential for alternative paths of development,” which “raises questions as to 
the possible material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative 
structure.”12 As such, an ideational shift occurs in two distinct realms: ideational collapse, 
and the consolidation of new ideas,13 which can also be sketched out as push-and-pull 
factors.14  
 The legitimacy crisis of neoliberal ideas constitutes the “push” side of the 
equilibrium. The neoliberal paradigm, in the Polanyian sense of the term, paved the way 
for “disembedded” markets from political and social structures as a result of the 
commodification of land, labour, and money.15 The unshakeable trust placed in the 
primacy and welfare-enhancing capacity of unfettered markets vis-à-vis states is based on 
a set of ideas that has constituted conventional wisdom since the 1980s: advocating 
financial liberalization, privatization, and the independence of Central Banks and 
regulatory institutions, along with a disdain for state intervention.16 Also known as the 
“Washington Consensus” and backed by the sheer material capabilities of US-led global 
governance institutions, these neoliberal ideas became immensely influential. However, 
rather than advancing the economic welfare of the unprivileged masses through “trickle-
down” economics, the neoliberal paradigm exacerbated income inequalities and deepened 
financial fragilities in the developed world and beyond.17 On that note, the 2008 financial 
crisis marks a critical juncture because, for the first time in the post-1945 order, all major 
Western economies simultaneously plunged into an economic deadlock, which severely 
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hit the Anglo-American core of global capitalism.18 The collapse of giant financial 
institutions, mounting household debt, and a steep rise in unemployment figures in the 
US and Europe put the neoliberal paradigm to a severe test.19  
 What deepened the crisis of the liberal market economy model was that the 
Western governments could not handle the aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis in an 
effective and sustained manner to fix the structural fault lines within the global economy. 
In effect, neoliberalism took a more techno-managerial turn in the crisis-ridden European 
countries, due to the “constitutionalization of austerity” regimes “in the name of 
necessity, whatever the actual state of play.”20 The heavy reliance on unwarranted 
austerity measures exacerbated economic stagnation and profoundly deteriorated the 
social fabric in Greece, Spain, Italy, and beyond.21 Reflecting the failure of the centrist 
political parties to steer a course out of the Eurozone turmoil, the dwindling purchasing 
power of citizens further jeopardized the legitimacy of the liberal market paradigm in the 
eyes of the electorate in several states. As a result, economic liberalism and political 
pluralism, once perceived as the safest route to prosperity and power, were increasingly 
discredited, even in countries positioned in the EU’s sphere of influence.22   
 The “pull” factors, on the other hand, inform the consolidation of new 
developmental ideas, primarily driven by the non-Western powers. Given that the power 
balance is shifting in favor of the emerging countries, and since the US is not as strong 
and willing as it once was to provide the public goods needed to stabilize the current 
international order, it is more likely that new regional orders are in the making across the 
world. In the coming “multi-order world,” so Flockhart argues, “with alternative 
international orders emerging, cost-benefit calculations of states that do not really share 
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the fundamental principles rooted in a Western identity look set to change.”23 The 
alternative developmental paradigms gaining predominance among the non-Western 
great powers diverge from the conventional neoliberal ideas. As such, non-Western great 
powers rely on a strategic model of capitalism—that is, “state capitalism,”24 which 
constitutes “the only candidate to put liberal hegemony into question, and a further 
deepening of the current US-led global liberal order.” 25  State capitalism has two 
distinctive political economy images that distinguish it from liberal developmental ideas.   
 First, from an economic viewpoint, state capitalism prescribes state intervention 
as a permanent feature of economic upgrading. 26  The literature on comparative 
capitalisms suggests that the state capitalist model represents a distinct variety in terms of 
key domestic institutional spheres with its emphasis on (i) state-permeated corporate 
relations, (ii) government-led industrial and innovation policies, (iii) political control over 
regulatory institutions and strategic utilization of financial statecraft, and (iv) 
“personalized network of capital accumulation” strategies.27 Hence, this model is at odds 
with the central prescription of neoliberal ideas in terms of the organization of national 
economies. State capitalists think that markets are mainly tools “that serve national 
interests, or at least those of ruling elites, rather than as an engine of opportunity for the 
individual.”28 To be clear, state intervention is an old-age theme in the comparative 
development literature, and a considerable amount of ink has been spilled about it. The 
state-led import substitution industrialization (ISI) in Asia and Latin America until the 
late 1970s and different forms of developmental state practices among the Northeast 
“Asian Tigers” offer rich insights in terms of the potentials and limits of the state’s role in 
making and shaping markets. 29  Likewise, as some scholars have meticulously 
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documented, states assumed constitutive roles in the early stages of today’s advanced 
economies, through a Listian “infant industry promotion.”30  
 The modalities of the state-market configuration in contemporary state capitalist 
economies, however, are different from classical statist ideas. Heterodox developmental 
models target rapid economic “catch-up” policies not over private actors, but through 
them by investing in research and development (R&D) through public-private 
partnerships, sovereign wealth funds, and fiscal stability within the broader contours of a 
capitalist framework.31 Thus, the state’s patient involvement in its domestic economy is 
framed as a strategic choice to design long-term alternatives that promote post-Listian 
foreign investment, labor market, and trade policies.32 Neo-developmentalism, as some 
scholars put it, “allows domestic firms to seize global economies of scale and 
technological updating processes, but also innovation policy and an activist trade 
policy.”33  
China, as the paragon of state capitalism, pursues global economic integration 
along with exempting key sectors—such as energy, R&D, and indigenous defense—
deemed “to be of high strategic importance.”34 In this way, state-market relations reflect a 
new form of selective protectionism. For instance, China allows German car 
manufacturers to invest in its domestic market, if they are willing to form 50/50 joint 
ventures to ensure the transfer of know-how.35 As Strange has documented, “gated 
globalization” policies are essentially different from liberal varieties of capitalism in 
terms of the organization of state-market relations, foreign trade and transnational 
investments.36 On the financial front, these economies advocate heterodox ideas that “aim 
beyond the mainstream goal of monetary stability.”37 For instance, the independence of 
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central banks and other regulatory institutions, the sacrosanct norm of the neoliberal 
paradigm with its exclusive emphasis on inflation targeting, is now being challenged, as 
the emerging powers increasingly rely on a “developmental central banking” that 
considers financial autonomy and economic stability along with monetary prudence.38  
 Second, from a political viewpoint, the ruling elites in state capitalist economies 
hold a distinct set of political frames that organize domestic production and distributive 
dynamics. It is rather striking that most conceptualizations of state capitalism, especially 
in the varieties of capitalism literature, underappreciate the constitutive role of 
nationalist-populist ideas undergirding state-permeated economies. As Gilpin points out, 
however, “every economic system rests on a particular political order, [and] its nature 
cannot be understood aside from politics.”39 Seen this way, state capitalist models are 
embedded in a distinct set of illiberal political governance structures incompatible with 
liberal democracy and political pluralism. In the post-crisis global political economy, 
when “democratic efficacy, self-confidence and economic dynamism recedes” in liberal 
democracies,40 the performance of the non-Western powers has lent credence to the 
notion that sustainable economic development can be accomplished in majoritarian 
political settings. Under strongman regimes, in those political economies, market capture 
becomes a critical aspect of state-business relations – that is, the ruling elite pick up 
winners and losers in the private sector based on their political loyalty. To maximize their 
power, political elites in state capitalist models are inclined to use lucrative resources, 
government subsidies, infrastructure projects, and credit allocation schemes to reward 
politically loyal economic actors and weaponize taxation and other regulatory 
instruments to punish dissidents. 
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The future of state capitalism, therefore, becomes immensely important as an 
alternative ideational paradigm capable of making its way into other cases through its 
global reach. In times of uncertainty and anxiety, strongman regimes prioritizing 
collective security, pursuit of national glory and national will over individual rights and 
personal liberties are perceived as the safest route to prosperity and power.41 State 
capitalist models, so the logic goes, with their exclusive emphasis on “rapid 
development” and “national sovereignty,” embrace executive aggrandizement under the 
disguise of swift decision-making and effective policy implementation. As a result, state 
capitalist ideas gaining currency in like-minded states such as Russia and China pose new 
reference points for the ruling elites in other countries located in the semi-periphery of 
the Anglo-American core.42  
 
Interests: New Material Linkages 
As Colin Hay points out, crises and large-scale social fluctuations are conducive to new 
ideas as “moment[s] of transformation,” since the old ones are generally associated with 
the accumulation of structural contradictions.43 However, one question remains: Whose 
ideas matter “in times of decisive intervention,”44 and what drives the allure of new 
developmental norms at critical junctures? New perspectives gain true prominence when 
they are informed by and reinforced with the parallel redistribution of material 
capabilities. Therefore, the second mechanism through which the non-Western great 
powers exert influence beyond their borders consists of material interests. Accordingly, 
deepening trade linkages, ample investment and credit opportunities, and flexible 
developmental aid schemes in different shapes and forms incentivize political elites 
elsewhere to sustain illiberal regimes.45  
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As stated above, although the 2008 global financial crisis marked a watershed in 
terms of accelerating material shifts in the global political economy, the rise of the “rest” 
had started earlier. Over the last two decades, BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa), which constitutes more than 40 percent of the global population, 
has gradually become a new center of gravity in the international economy. The share of 
BRICS in the world GNP (as measured in 2005 USD PPP) almost doubled between 1997 
and 2017, with an impressive increase from 15.4 to 30.4 percent. The share of the US, on 
the other hand, decreased from 23 to 18.2 percent.46 The re-emergence of China as an 
astounding trading state along with other BRICS members also reshuffled global trade 
relations. The share of BRICS in global trade, for instance, increased from 11.8 to 32 
percent over the same time-period.47 Also, according to the Fortune 500 list ranking the 
top 500 global companies around the world, China has 120 multinationals, only second to 
the US with 126 companies.48 The material shifts in the global political economy, as 
Monck and Foa point out, have raised question marks about the economic effectiveness 
of liberal democratic systems. The countries ranked “not free” by Freedom House now 
make up 33 percent of the global income, in comparison to 12 percent in 1990. This shift 
is telling, since it “matches the level they achieved in the early 1930s, during the rise of 
fascism in Europe, and surpassing the heights they reached in the Cold War when Soviet 
power was at its apex.”49  
 The massive production potential, favorable demographic conditions, and 
bourgeoning trade, investment and credit linkages provide new policy space and material 
capabilities for the non-Western great powers to exert more leverage in target countries. 
To be clear, the emerging literature indicates that autocratic regimes do not always 
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deliberately promote illiberal practices in target countries;50 but, as Risse and Babayan 
suggest, the promotion of strongman regimes might also unintentionally “derive from 
[their] attempt to move the [target] country closer into its own sphere of influence by 
offering stronger economic and security ties.”51  
 The emerging state capitalist economies, as a reflection of the strongman regimes 
at home, prioritize a distinct set of norms in their foreign economic relations, which gives 
them further leverage due to the improvements in their material capabilities. Rather than 
attaching strict political conditionality to economic partnership agreements or 
development assistance, these states tend to promote experimentation-led flexible 
cooperation schemes in their relations with partner countries. As Balding points out, 
“unlike Western lenders, China does not require its partners to meet stringent conditions 
related to corruption, human rights, or financial sustainability.”52 For instance, it is 
estimated that between 2000 and 2017 China loaned some USD 143 billion to African 
governments and state-owned enterprises alone.53 Chin and Thakur assert that Chinese 
state institutions and ministries “have worked with their counterparts in African states 
[…] to share China’s lessons on […] the financing of national development projects 
including preferred balances between the financial sector, infrastructure, and industrial 
and agricultural development.”54 Thus, economic vigor, shifting material capabilities, and 
flexible corporation schemes turn the emerging great powers into promising partners in 









Table 1: Three pillars of emerging great power influence in target states  
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Institutions: Networks of Influence 
All international/regional orders rest on a network of complementary institutions that 
perpetuate rule-based interactions and “encourage collective images” among actors.55 
Hall aptly states that “new ideas are only fully realized when they become 
institutionalized into standard operating procedures of key organizations.”56 In view of 
the complex reciprocal relationships among ideas and institutions, Cox points to the fact 
that “institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn 
influence the development of ideas and material capabilities.”57 Institutions are settled in 
ways that “lock in” power hierarchies and perpetuate privileged arrangements for order-
establishing actors.58 Hence, in the absence of functioning institutional networks, or in 
the event of a significant dissonance between distinct pillars of a particular order, new 
ideas and emerging economic linkages are susceptible to major reversals.  
 In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Bretton Woods institutions 
upholding the liberal paradigm found themselves under growing pressure. In that sense, 
the most astounding status-seekers of the non-Western world pursue a “dual-track” 
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strategy in the form of reform and innovation.59 On the one hand, emerging powers try 
hard to reform existing international institutions so as to be represented on a more equal 
footing. On the other hand, they devote considerable efforts to establishing alternative 
sets of economic governance institutions resonating with their ideas and material power 
to draw other states into their orbits.  
 In terms of institutional reform, China, Russia and other rising powers have 
pressed hard for an overhaul of international financial institutions (such as the IMF and 
the World Bank) to make their voices heard. The emerging economies have finally 
managed to increase their quota shares in the IMF and the World Bank, although the 
reforms were hardly revolutionary.60 The G7, the Western-dominated intergovernmental 
institution that used to be the main platform for coordinating global economic policy, was 
also replaced by the G20, with the inclusion of several key non-Western powers such as 
China, India, Turkey, and South Africa. The G20’s emergence as the new focal point to 
coordinate global economic policies proves that Western powers’ weight as stewards of 
the international economic order have slipped, despite the resilience of the status quo.  
 In terms of institutional innovation, non-Western great powers have expended a 
great deal of effort and resources to create new institutions that are becoming 
increasingly attractive alternatives for other emerging middle powers. One of the most 
ambitious initiatives of the non-Western states as “institution-builders” is probably the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Backed by China, the AIIB aims to foster 
economic development in Asia through funding mega-sized infrastructure projects, 
partnership with private actors, and establishing new financial networks. The AIIB has 
been considered “China’s answer to the World Bank” and received a harsh response from 
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the US.61 The AIIB, combined with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), poses a challenge 
to the economic institutions of the liberal international order. The consolidation of new 
political institutions such as BRICS and its economic pillar (the New Development 
Bank), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Eurasian Economic Union also 
undergird the emerging web of institutions promoting alternative policies in the global 
South. On that note, the BRI is considered the most ambitious developmental initiative 
that the Chinese have ever put into implementation. Benabdallah, for instance, 
documented that the BRI shows “not only Beijing’s capacity to generate new norms (in 
international development, mainly) but also its ability to socialise and persuade other 
actors to internalise China’s alternatives.” 62  It is perhaps too early to judge the 
transformative capacity of the newly established institutions. Yet, it seems valid to claim 
that the new economic governance institutions stem from alternative ideas and reflect 
shifting material capacities at the global level. Layne, therefore, has a point when he 
states that “the staying power of these institutions are uncertain but at the very least they 
are important symbolically.”63 The following section documents how non-Western great 
powers have a demonstrative effect on other emerging middle powers and how state 
capitalism makes its way into their sphere, with reference to the Turkish case.   
 
 
The Turkish Case: A Nascent Form of State Capitalism?  
 
This article focuses on Turkey as a crucial case, based on the “least likely” design, in 
order to assess whether (and if so, in which ways) the non-Western great powers inform 
developmental patterns in emerging middle states. A “least likely” case “is one that in all 
dimensions of theoretical interest is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, and yet it 
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does so.”64 There are three main reasons to expect only a very limited impact by the non-
Western great powers in the Turkish case. First, Turkey has been “locked in” Western 
alliance since the inception of the post-1945 liberal order, through deep-rooted 
institutional links with the NATO, the Council of Europe, and the EU candidacy process. 
Second, despite military breakdowns, with a functioning electoral democracy and multi-
party system, Westernization has been an integral part of Turkey’s secular state identity 
for more than nine decades. Turkey’s Western orientation as a “grand strategy” even 
precedes the establishment of the Republic.65 Third, not only the leverage of, but also the 
linkages with the Western powers prove very deep and multidimensional in the Turkish 
case. Turkey has embraced the neoliberal economic model since the early 1980s.66 
Turkey’s Western partners accounted for 54 percent of its total trade in 2017, and almost 
70 percent of the inward direct investment originates from the West.67 Ostensibly, then, 
Turkey constitutes an unlikely example to be influenced by the non-Western great 
powers, either directly or indirectly, and their effects should be limited.68 However, as 
demonstrated below in reference to the 3Is framework, the developmental patterns in the 
Turkish political economy seem to gradually shift from Western-oriented neoliberal 
norms towards state capitalist overtones.  
 
Ideational Shifts: Reversal of the Regulatory State 
Turkey’s gradual shift from the neoliberal paradigm is informed particularly by the 2008 
financial crisis. In the pre-crisis era, the economic framework that the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government followed was very much compatible with the 
augmented version of the Washington Consensus, also called the “regulatory state 
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paradigm” implemented under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions and the EU. 
The predominant economic template to which the AKP adhered in its first term in office 
harkens back to Turkey’s 2001 crisis, which proved to be the deepest economic shock the 
country had encountered in decades. The shaky coalition government at the time 
implemented a comprehensive set of institutional reforms under the stewardship of 
Kemal Derviş, the former Vice President of the World Bank, as the minister in charge of 
economic affairs with extensive powers. The three-pronged program—with its strong 
emphasis on the state’s fiscal discipline, strict oversight of the financial system, and 
structural transformation through privatizations—received the unequivocal material and 
ideational support of the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU. In line with the regulatory 
state paradigm nine independent regulatory institutions were established, along with legal 
independence granted to the Central Bank.69  The AKP government, which won a 
sweeping majority in parliament in the 2002 general elections, embraced the reform 
template with no discernible attempt to edit the neoliberal orthodoxy.70 Rather, the reform 
program garnered strong support at the political level since it was deemed “necessary to 
converge with the EU.”71    
 The allure of the regulatory state paradigm in Turkey, however, experienced a 
gradual decline in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, as some government elites 
grew increasingly sceptic about mainstream neoliberal ideas.72 It was at this critical 
juncture that the state capitalist discourse started to make inroads into governmental 
circles, albeit in a staggered manner. The chief economic adviser of the Turkish 
president, for instance, denounced the neoliberal orthodoxy as “enslaving”73 and argued 
that “liberal economic and political integration [policies] have become bankrupt.”74 
	 19	
Praising China as a successful model of development, the chief advisor endorsed the 
state’s active involvement in the economy, without entirely crowding out private actors: 
“State has to involve in the economy […] to regulate it, [and] consider monetary and 
fiscal policies as [instruments of] economic security and national development.”75  
Given that the 2008 financial crisis carved out space for new developmental 
policies, Turkish policy-makers also became more attuned to the policy repertoire of new 
developmentalist ideas.76  To start with, the Industrial Strategy Document was adopted in 
2011 (updated in 2015 and 2019), under the auspices of the then Ministry of Science, 
Industry, and Technology, along with the involvement of public and private bodies.77 The 
long-term goal of the industrial plan was to position Turkey as “the production base of 
Eurasia in medium and high-tech products.”78 Through public-private partnerships—an 
investment model gaining traction, with the state guaranteeing loans and revenue for 
participating companies—the Turkish government kicked off mega-sized multi-billion-
dollar infrastructure projects, including airports, a giant canal bisecting the country to 
open a new trade route, railways, highways, city hospitals, and other grandiose 
construction sites. 79  The government also established a Joint Enterprise Group 
comprising five private companies under the auspices of the then Science, Industry and 
Technology Ministry to create Turkey’s first domestic automobile brand,80 and the 
Turkish president declared his intention to develop “native and national technologies” 
especially in the automobile, aviation, and indigenous defense industries as priority 
sites.81  
The new indigenous turn in the Turkish political economy, however, consolidated 
the personalized network of capital accumulation that conforms with the basic tenets of 
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state capitalism. In effect, the government stepped up investments in enormous 
infrastructure projects, providing ample opportunity to reshape power balances within the 
capitalist class and utilize public money to maintain distributive coalitions. According to 
the 2018 World Bank report, with an investment of USD 143 billion, Turkey became the 
fourth largest-investor—following China, Brazil, and India—in infrastructure projects 
carried out through public-private partnerships.82 The data also suggest that five of the 
world’s top ten private sponsors of public infrastructure projects are Turkish companies,83 
with overlapping ownerships in construction, media, and energy, which are reported to 
have close ties to the government.84  
 The shifts in the predominant economic policies should be analyzed in 
conjunction with the political path consolidated in Turkey over the past decade. Parallel 
to the global transformations, the state capitalist overtones correlate with the rise of the 
strongman regime at home imbued with a growing anti-Western discourse. The 
institutional regression toward political illiberalism became discernible following the 
second term of the AKP government, “which effectively marked the beginning of a new 
era of Turkey’s political economy.”85 In June 2011, the AKP under the leadership of 
Erdoğan succeeded in outperforming its rivals for the third time in a row, by obtaining 












Figure 1. Vote shares of Turkey's major parties (%) 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, Republic of Turkey 
Note: The parliamentary and presidential elections took place at the same time on 24 June 2018. The figure 
above shows the outcome of the vote shares of major parties in parliament. Erdoğan was elected president 
in the same elections, with 52.6 percent of the total vote.     	
	
  
With successive electoral victories and through the step-by-step concentration of 
executive power, institutional checks and balances gradually eroded, with irrevocable 
ramifications beyond the realm of politics. Significant setbacks in terms of freedom of 
expression, media freedom, and independence of the judicial system reduced the 
democratic space. The political shift in Turkey is closely associated with the rise of 
illiberalism across the world. This rise of political aggrandizement was legitimized, inter 
alia, under the disguise of swift decision-making and economic efficiency.86 Turkey’s 
transition from a parliamentary regime to a Russian-style hyper-presidentialism in April 
2017 marked a watershed in this regard, as the new system accumulated extensive power 
in the hands of a strong executive authority.87 Following a polarized campaign process 
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attempt of July 2016, 52 percent of the Turkish voters approved of the presidential 
system, which extensively expanded the president’s executive discretion.88 In the June 
2018 elections, Turkey formally transitioned to executive presidentialism, with Erdoğan 
elected as the first president.  
 Turkey’s gradual drift toward illiberalism, however, was by no means uncontested 
and straightforward. The sweeping political majoritarianism and rising suppression over 
different corners of opposition had deep ramifications on different segments of Turkish 
society. The most explicit sign of societal uneasiness about the Turkish government’s 
political path was the Gezi protests that erupted in May-June 2013. On 28 May 2013, a 
wave of civil unrest began in Gezi Park, a small area of trees abutting Istanbul’s central 
place, Taksim Square. The planned demolition of the park and the forceful eviction of the 
protesters by police forces sparked a nationwide mobilization spreading to all corners of 
the country. The protests were more than an expression of concern for the environment; 
rather, they were an outburst of social anxieties about the majoritarian turn in Turkish 
politics, interference in private life-style choices, and political suppression in a multitude 
of forms.89 The response of the government was to launch an organized nationalist-
populist counter-discourse along the lines of “national will,” by portraying the protests 
“as the latest attempt of the West” to “terminate Turkey’s presence.”90 The exclusive 
emphasis on “national will,” “electoral majoritarianism,” and “sovereignty” imbued with 
anti-Westernism became more conspicuous following the failed coup attempt of July 
2016. As a result, Turkey ceased to be considered a “free country” according to the 




Table 2. Political rights and civil liberties in Turkey (2002-2018) 
Year/indicator 2002 2008 2014 2018 
Political rights 4/7 3/7 3/7 5/7 
Civil liberties 5/7 3/7 4/7 6/7 
Freedom status “Partly free” “Partly free” “Partly free” “Not free” 
Source: Freedom House, 2018 Freedom in the World (1=best; 7=worst)  
 
 
In summary, Turkey’s drift towards state capitalism had repercussions on the economic 
and political fronts. The new developmentalist policies were put into implementation 
under nationalist-populist overtones. As discussed in the conceptual section, however, the 
shifts on the ideational front should be analyzed in conjunction with the redistribution of 
material capabilities and the interaction with institutional structures to assess the limits of 
the possible for Turkish version of state capitalism.    
 
 
Interests: Trade and Investment Linkages 
Parallel to the upswing of new developmentalism—and, in fact, undergirding current 
ideational shifts—the material leverage of the Russia-China axis has strengthened in a 
steady manner. First, Russia and China upgraded their status as Turkey’s major trading 
partners. Turkey’s total trade volume with the Russia-China axis amounted to around 
USD 50 billion in 2018, reaching USD 60 billion in current prices in 2013, just before the 
diplomatic rift with Russia due to the Turkish air forces shooting down a Russian SU-24 
fighter jet near the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015.91 The severity of the crisis 
notwithstanding, bilateral cooperation recovered rather swiftly over the last four years 
and, as Putin declared, “relations between Russia and Turkey are taking on an 
increasingly more profound and substantive character in the economy.”92 Russia was 
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Turkey’s third-largest trading partner in 2017, with USD 22.2 billion, despite the 
government’s long-term plans to diversify its energy imports. China became the second 
major trading partner, expected to overtake Germany in the coming years. These bilateral 
trade relations, however, prove highly asymmetric, as Turkey’s total trade deficit vis-à-
vis the Russia-China axis was USD 37.2 billion in 2017, hinting at the degree of Turkey’s 
growing dependence on imports from the non-Western great powers (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Trade volume between Turkey, Russia and China 
Turkey's exports in billion USD (1) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
China 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.6 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.9 
Russia 3.4 4.6 5.9 6.6 6.9 5.9 3.5 1.7 2.7 
Total 5 6.8 8.3 9.4 10.5 8.7 5.9 4 5.6 
Turkey's imports in billion USD (2) 
China 12.6 17.1 21.6 21.2 24.6 24.9 24.8 25.4 23.3 
Russia 19.4 21.6 23.9 26.6 25 25.2 20.4 15.1 19.5 
Total 32 38.7 45.5 47.8 49.6 50.1 45.2 40.5 42.8 
1+2 Total 37 45 53.8 57.2 60.1 58.8 51.1 44.5 48.4 
 
 
New investment opportunities emerging between the parties are reinforcing trade 
interdependence as the second pillar of material linkages. With the rise of non-Western 
actors, Turkish policy-makers have also become more eager to benefit from the “shifting 
centers of economic gravity.”93 The current mega-sized construction and infrastructure 
projects emerge as main sites of investments for Russian and Chinese companies. The 
projects in the energy sector—such as the Akkuyu nuclear power plants worth USD 20 
billion and the TurkStream pipeline project—offer lucrative opportunities for Russian 
firms operating in Turkey. The sovereign wealth funds of both states signed an agreement 
in April 2018 to launch a joint investment fund worth USD 1 billion. Significantly larger 
than the current joint investment fund, this initiative appears to carry symbolic value for 
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Turkish policy-makers, as they consider extant investment projects with Russia (and 
China) as first new steps heralding a new, and arguably non-Western, order in the 
making. The board member of the Türkiye Wealth Fund at the time and chief adviser to 
the Turkish president, for instance, suggested that the “world economy is moving to the 
East and the Turkey-Russia line will be one of the new economic power centers of the 
New World Equation.”94  
 The investment projects also focus on strategic sectors with “high exit costs” such 
as the national defense industry, where Turkey currently stands at odds with NATO 
members due to Ankara’s shifting priorities. On that note, Turkey sealed a potentially 
“game-changing” agreement with Russia on the procurement of the S-400 anti-ballistic 
missile defense systems in 2019 and made a down payment for the USD 2.5 billion in the 
midst of severe US criticism concerning Turkey’s decision as a NATO ally.95 Although 
Turkey and Russia have held opposite foreign policy stances regarding the war in 
Georgia (2008), the Syrian civil war (2011-) and the Ukrainian conflict (2014-), multi-
level interdependence between the two actors continues to intensify,96 on the basis of a 
“strong anti-Western and anti-European rhetoric.” 97  Even though Turkish officials 
criticized Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkey did not join the Western powers in their 
economic sanctions against Russia.98 On the contrary, in an attempt to purge Western 
economic dominance, Turkey and Russia—along with China—decided to switch to local 
currencies in foreign trade relations, as a move to reduce dependence on the US dollar.99   
 Third, parallel to the shifts in material capabilities, Turkish policy-makers have 
developed a strong interest in taking an active part in alternative regional integration 
projects such as China’s BRI. Turkey has already established cooperation with the 
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Chinese concerning railway infrastructure development, finance, and transportation 
projects to diversify its economic partners and supply chains.100 The Turkish government 
formed “a working group specially dealing with Turkey’s engagement with OBOR [BRI] 
by the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs with inputs from the ministries of 
transportation, energy, economy and customs.”101 China, along with Russia, also emerged 
as a new destination for the Turkish government to diversify foreign credit sources. As an 
outcome of the souring relations with the West, the Turkish government has struggled 
hard to avoid at all costs renewing a stand-by agreement with the IMF in the post-2008 
context. This was accompanied by an active search for alternative credit sources. 
Therefore, in his official visit to China in July 2018, the Turkish treasury and finance 
minister announced that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided a USD 
3.6 billion loan package, to be channeled towards investments in the energy and 
transportation sectors.102 As the Turkish government reached a credit agreement with 
China at a critical juncture—that is, when bilateral relations with the US and the EU were 
souring rapidly—Turkey’s “China card” conveyed a symbolic message in terms of 
shifting alliances more than its material value.   
 
Institutions: New Friends in the Making 
The interface of ideas and material capabilities should be analyzed in conjunction with 
institutions, so as to fully account for the pathways of complex interactions. In a post-
liberal international order where material power is spreading, Turkey’s institutional 
relationship with Western actors also looks set to change. The transformation in Turkey-
EU relations over the past decade is a striking case in point. Turkish policy-makers for 
quite a long time framed the EU membership process as a normative force for the good, 
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to serve as a base for Turkey’s political liberalization, democratization and transition to a 
rule-based liberal market economy. The restructuration of state-market relations 
emphasized by the EU conditionality had been an overriding theme in Turkish politics 
during the first term of the AKP rule.  
The EU, however, has recently been reframed as an actor “blocking Turkey’s 
progress” by the same political elites.103 If the credibility of commitment problems on 
part of the EU constituted one side of Turkey’s drift away from the EU, new institutional 
opportunities in the emerging world also motivated the Turkish ruling elites to capitalize 
on the anti-Western rhetoric. In this vein, BRICS has emerged as an attractive substitute 
to deepen institutional linkages.104 For instance, the chief adviser to the president of 
Turkey claimed several times that the EU is destined to “break up”105 and pointed to the 
emerging powers as an alternative to a Western alliance.106 Mehmet Simsek, Turkey’s 
former economy minister, announced in 2017 that “Turkey seriously considers” 
becoming a member of the BRICS development bank to benefit from the ample 
investment opportunities and projects.107 Finally, the Turkish president reiterated his 
eagerness to join BRICS as the sixth member during the 10th BRICS Summit in 
Johannesburg in July 2018. He even proposed “BRICST” as the modified name of the 
grouping if and when Turkey joins.108 The Turkish president on several occasions 
indicated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative for Turkey to 
substitute for the EU membership goal.109 In a highly symbolic move, for instance, the 
government closed down the EU Ministry in June 2018.110  
 The regulatory institutions, established as part of the EU candidacy process and 
serving as hallmarks of the neoliberal paradigm were also transformed in line with the 
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state capitalist paradigm. Following the global trend in the post-crisis era, the Turkish 
government has re-politicized the regulatory institutions.111 The independence of those 
bodies was first de facto curtailed, and then de jure political control over regulatory 
institutions was codified by government degree.112 The de-delegation of authority and 
reinstatement of executive power over regulatory bodies, such as central banks, is a 
reflection of the shifting sands, as institutional checks and balances are increasingly 
considered as impediments to swift decision-making.113   
The debates surrounding the status of the Central Bank of Turkey are worth 
noting. The idea of “developmental central banking,” as practiced in several emerging 
powers in different forms, has made its way into the Turkish case.114  Ali Babacan, the 
deputy prime minister responsible for the Treasury and a staunch supporter of the 
regulatory state paradigm at the time, opposed political intervention in regulatory 
institutions. The governor of the Central Bank, Erdem Başçı, also resisted government 
attempts to reduce interest rates in late 2013. Erdoğan and his close advisers, however, 
were increasingly advocating a more interventionist developmental paradigm. Turkish 
president severely criticized the Central Bank governor, claiming that he, and not the 
unelected central bank bureaucrats, represented the will of the Turkish citizens; therefore, 
he felt more responsibility towards them than to the “unelected” governors of regulatory 
institutions.115 Erdoğan also appointed ministers in favor of hands-on approach through 
lower-interest rates, more flexible fiscal and financial regulations, and political oversight 
of monetary policy. Lambasting key aspects of augmented neoliberalism (such as 
inflation-targeting and tight monetary policies) as untenable, the president advocated 
more interventionist investment and employment policies by stating “[Turkey is] in need 
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of investment, employment and production.”116 Not surprisingly, Ali Babacan was not 
reappointed as minister in the new government after the November 2015 elections. The 
powers of the deputy prime minister responsible for overseeing all regulatory institutions 
were curtailed, and his supervisory authority was transferred to other ministries. 
Similarly, Erdem Başçı was appointed to a different post once his first term as Central 
Bank governor ended in April 2016. 
 On a final note, Turkish policy-makers created a new sovereign wealth fund 
(Türkiye Wealth Fund). The Fund with its centralized budget controlling public assets in 
the value of USD 200 billion was launched to finance mega-sized infrastructure projects 
for which private investments proved inadequate. In the aftermath of the June 2018 
elections, which rubber-stamped Turkey’s transition to hyper-presidentialism, the Turkish 
president appointed himself as chairman of the Wealth Fund and his son-in-law as the 
deputy chairman.117 The Türkiye Wealth Fund signed its first agreement with the wealth 
fund of Russia in the presence of the Turkish and Russian presidents who launched the 
joint Russia-Turkey Investment Fund. The amendments in legislation also provided scope 
for the Treasury to become a partner to private firms,118 reflecting the market capture 
tendencies in state capitalist economies.  
 
The Paradoxes of State Capitalism: Limits of the Possible  
 
The discussion so far suggests that alternative forms of state-market relations have gained 
traction in the global political economy. The Turkish example is a case in point. That 
being said, it is arguably too early to make conclusive judgements, for two main reasons. 
First, state capitalism with its distinct varieties is still a work in progress. In the post-
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crisis period, the international developmental regime appears to have become “loosely 
coupled,” in the sense that there exists disconnect between international economic 
organizations, developmental ideas, and the distribution of material capabilities.119 Thus, 
the high degree of regime coherence we have observed during the neo-liberal era is 
giving way to more fragmented development regimes. On the one hand, this should be 
considered a positive change, as it carves out precious policy space for developing 
countries. On the other hand, new developmentalist ideas are not as coherent and clear-
cut as the principles of the liberal market model implemented under the aegis of the US-
led international organizations. In a “loosely coupled” development regime, inchoate, 
staggered and often contradictory experimentation gives direction to policy design and 
implementation – as documented in the Turkish case. Still, neoliberal policies carry 
significant weight in the global South, whereas a growing number of states also adopt 
alternative developmental paradigms. As Ban and Blyth point out, the emerging powers 
“attempt to balance their adoption of select parts of the Washington consensus template 
while defending and often reinventing the relevance of state-led development 
policies.”120  
 Second, the jury is still out on the long-term allure of state-permeated economic 
models. Snyder underlines that rulers in liberal democracies acquire their legitimacy and 
mandate through free and fair elections, which is independent of their economic 
performance in the short term.121 The state capitalist models based on illiberal political 
regimes, however, retain their legitimacy primarily through economic efficiency, mega-
sized infrastructure projects and military aggrandizement. In this regard, the critical 
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question still remains unanswered: Are the emerging powers capable of sustaining state 
capitalism to build coherent alternatives in a multi-order world in the long-term?  
 The tensions between sustainable economic development and illiberal governance 
appear to be the major challenge for emerging states seeking status improvement in 
global politics. The literature on comparative development maintains that sustainable 
long-term growth is predominantly determined by the quality of institutions.122 At the 
heart of the paradox lies the alleged incompatibility of extractive institutional structures 
and economic development in state-permeated economies. As middle-income economies 
move from labor-intensive and low-cost exports toward capital-intensive production, 
labor is re-allocated from agriculture to manufacturing. This necessitates inclusive 
political institutions, especially for skill formation, to ensure high-value-added 
production.123 The peculiar configuration of political and economic institutions, therefore, 
may lead to a crisis of “performance legitimacy.”124 On the one hand, rulers subscribing 
to state capitalism have to maintain high growth performance to retain their popular 
legitimacy. On the other hand, long-term development under state capitalism may be 
hampered due to the extractive nature of institutions and the rising political expectations 
on part of the citizens acquiring more economic power.  
 The recent fluctuations in the Turkish economy and its political tribulations are 
illustrative in this regard. It appears that so far new developmental policies have not 
helped narrowing down the technology gap in Turkey, as it is heavily dependent on 
foreign capital due to low savings rates, a high current account deficit, and weak high-
tech export performance (Table 4).125 Turkish developmentalism still reflects a pattern of 
“deficit-led growth,” heavily relying on foreign capital to finance a spending spree by 
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domestic firms and households.126 The savings rates over the GDP stagnate around 15 
percent, whereas investments hover around 20 percent.127 The heavy reliance on foreign 
capital to sustain robust growth renders the Turkish economy vulnerable to external 
shocks. The latest developments transpired with the geopolitical frictions with the US and 
sanctions imposed by the Trump administration in August 2018, for instance, triggered a 
flight of capital.128 Much deeper than the current spat with the Western states, the 
depletion of institutions is said to lurk below the surface. Acemoğlu and Üçer argue that 
the recent drift toward economic stagnation is causally linked to the increasingly arbitrary 
nature of political institutions crafted under the disguise of strong executive authority.129 
Seen this way, state capitalist models blended with nationalist-populist political overtones 
and illiberal institutions raise question marks concerning the sub-optimal determinants of 
long-term development. 
 
Table 4. Turkey: Selected indicators (2002-2018) 
 
2002 2008 2014 2016 2017 2018 
GDP (USD billion) 238 764 934 863 851 766 
Per capita (USD) 3,660 10,851 12,127 10,863 10,546 9,631 
CAD (% of GDP) -0.3 -5.2 -4.7 -3.8 -5.6 -3.5 
FDI (billion USD) 0.6 19.9 13.1 13.3 11 13 
High-tech exports  
(% manufactured exports) 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.3 
Note: GDP and GDP per capita figures (first and second rows) are in current USD. CAD: Current 
account deficit. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.  
 
 
State capitalist models tend to rely on different extraction mechanisms to ensure rapid 
development and to maintain domestic distributive coalitions. Russia, for instance, 
achieves this through energy resources, whereas China relies on its cheap labor force and 
massive domestic market. In the Turkish version of state capitalism, land, construction, 
and public tenders have been the principal commodity of extraction and distribution, with 
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construction utilized as the main driver of growth.130 Between 1984 and 2002, “the 
average floor area granted for construction permits per annum roughly amounted to 64.6 
million m2, whereas it more than doubled to 143 million m2 during the AKP’s 14 year 
rule.”131 As a proxy, the Central Bank’s housing price index increased 132 percent 
between 2010 and 2018.132 Although the AKP government reshuffled state-business 
relations by supporting politically loyal business groups through lucrative state 
incentives, public-private partnerships and extensive political support, the new business 
elites have not demonstrated the expected developmental performance. 133  On the 
contrary, Turkey’s GDP per capita in current prices appears to be stuck around USD 
10,000 over the last decade (Table 4). The Turkish case, therefore, shows that emerging 
powers may struggle to maintain their performance legitimacy through sustainable 
economic growth in the long term. 
	
Conclusion 
It is rarely contested that the liberal international order faces serious tests. The two main 
pillars of the US-led international architecture—namely, the free market economy and 
liberal democracy—are in shambles due to simultaneous internal and external challenges. 
The Western responses to the global financial crisis remained patchy, and the structural 
fault lines in the global economy have yet to be fixed. The increasing inequality and the 
failure of mainstream political parties to alleviate the concerns of those “left behind” in 
the process of neoliberal globalization have estranged the masses. As a result, the liberal 
international order has plunged into turbulence unprecedented since its formation. The 
shifting geopolitical and geo-economic landscape in the global political economy puts 
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additional pressure on mainstream developmental norms associated with Western-
dominated liberal order. 
 The alternative developmental paradigm gaining traction among the non-Western 
great powers—that is, state capitalism—is likely to have demonstrative effects on other 
middle powers as well. This article has examined the Turkish case that constitutes a 
striking example of this structural shift in the global political economy. To be clear, 
neoliberalism still carries significant weight in the way in which domestic economic and 
social relations are organized in Turkey and beyond. This appears particularly the case 
with regards to the unfettered financial markets and flexible labor market regulations. 
State capitalism with illiberal overtones, however, seems to be on the rise as an 
alternative paradigm expanding its global reach. This article has demonstrated that the 
recent shifts in the Turkish political economy reflect this trend, while it has also 
highlighted the inchoate and often staggered implementation. The future of the “multi-
order world,” therefore, would be informed not only by the capacity of the Western 
powers to revitalize liberal democracy and free market economy, but also by the ability 
of the state capitalist economies to offer a coherent and durable alternative to the 
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